Schinnerl v. Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 2016 BCSC 2026
The plaintiff worked for the defendant public sector employer between 2016, when she was terminated due to restructuring. She was offered 10 months salary continuance, which she refused. The defendant nevertheless continued to pay. After 3 months, the plaintiff then accepted employment from another public sector employer.
The Court noted:
“[23] The significant aspect of the plaintiff’s new position at Douglas College is that she worked part-time from June 13, 2016 to December 31, 2016. The defendant says that she had the opportunity to work full-time and she unreasonably declined to do so. Therefore, any obligation to pay salary in lieu of notice to the plaintiff ended when she started work with Douglas College. For her part, the plaintiff says she acted reasonably by starting to work part-time at Douglas College in order to complete her doctoral studies. She says her education was approved (and paid for) by the defendant and it was a benefit to her and Douglas College to complete her studies.”
[37] I can agree with the plaintiff that a dismissed employee is entitled to consider her long-term interests but I do not agree this means her former employer is required to pay for the interests of the plaintiff at issue here. Nor do I agree that the plaintiff is entitled to be placed in the best possible position in relation to her long-term career objective following her dismissal. The plaintiff relies on previous judgments but they can be distinguished on the facts because there was no alternate position available to the dismissed employee (for example, Haff v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc., 2013 BCSC 1720 (CanLII), at para. 70). Similarly, the efforts of a disabled former employee to refocus his vocational aspirations in the absence of alternate work is a different case than the subject one (Birch v. London Drugs Ltd., 2003 BCSC 1253 (CanLII), at para. 27).
[39] In summary, the defendant’s obligation to pay notice to the plaintiff ended on June 13, 2016, when the plaintiff commenced employment with Douglas College. That was the date the plaintiff had the opportunity to work full-time and mitigate all of her damages after that date. She was entitled to choose not to take full-time employment but the cost of that choice does not lie with the defendant. I note the defendant has only paid the plaintiff up to June 1, 2016.